We examine the merits of subjecting an incumbent supplier of regulated services to antitrust review. We show that antitrust review can harm consumers even when the review entails no direct costs of implementation. The consumer harm arises in part because imperfect antitrust review can "crowd out"more e¤ective regulatory oversight. More generally, antitrust review can usefully complement regulatory oversight, but a¤ects the nature of the optimal regulatory policy.
Introduction
In its Trinko Decision, the U. S. Supreme Court identi…es little role for antitrust review in regulated industries where regulators are well equipped to design and enforce industry policy.
The Court (2004, § IV) observes that in settings where "a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm ... exists, the additional bene…t to competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small."More generally, though, antitrust review might usefully complement (or perhaps even substitute for) regulatory oversight in settings with emerging industry competition and limited regulatory resources (Levy and Spiller, 1996) . A central purpose of this research is to assess the merits of subjecting an incumbent regulated supplier to antitrust review in settings where regulatory and court oversight are both imperfect. We also examine how the presence of court oversight a¤ects the optimal design of regulatory policy.
To explore these issues formally, we analyze a model that admits varying degrees of imperfect oversight by a regulator and an antitrust court. Both entities have limited ability to assess whether a vertically-integrated incumbent supplier has undertaken an anticompetitive action designed to raise the costs of a retail competitor. The regulator also can set the price the incumbent supplier charges its rival for access to its network.
The regulator chooses her policy instruments optimally in light of industry characteristics and the nature of the prevailing antitrust review. The regulator's choice of an access price is complicated by the fact that the price has several e¤ects. The price a¤ects the incumbent supplier's upstream revenue, and thus its willingness to operate in the industry. The access price also a¤ects the entrant's production cost, and thus the extent to which the retail competitor can impose meaningful discipline on the incumbent supplier. By in ‡uencing the incumbent's pro…t margin on sales of access to the entrant, the access price also a¤ects the incumbent's incentive to raise its rival's cost (and thereby reduce the entrant's demand for network access).
We …nd that the regulator optimally increases the accuracy of her industry oversight and 1 reduces the access price as the incumbent supplier's ability to raise its rival's cost increases.
The more accurate oversight, which helps to deter the incumbent from undertaking the anticompetitive action, reduces the regulatory penalty the incumbent expects to incur in equilibrium. The reduced penalty enables the regulator to deliver the requisite upstream pro…t to the incumbent supplier even as she reduces the access price, thereby securing a lower retail price for consumers.
We also …nd that regulatory oversight and antitrust review are substitutes in the sense that the regulator optimally reduces the resources she devotes to improving the accuracy of her industry oversight as antitrust review becomes better able to impose e¤ective discipline on the incumbent supplier. Furthermore, the regulator increases the price the incumbent charges for access to its network as the incumbent's potential antitrust liability increases and as antitrust review becomes better able to detect the incumbent's anticompetitive action. In the face of increased antitrust liability, a higher access charge helps to o¤set the increased antitrust penalty the incumbent anticipates in equilibrium (even when it refrains from anticompetitive activity).
1 A higher access charge also helps to counteract the increased regulatory penalty the supplier anticipates in equilibrium when the regulator conserves resources by reducing the accuracy of her industry oversight in response to a more accurate antitrust review.
We consider settings where, as is common in practice, the penalties the regulator can impose on the incumbent supplier are limited. Consequently, it is not surprising that antitrust review often can usefully complement regulatory oversight in our model. However, even when antitrust review entails no direct costs, it can reduce consumer welfare. It will do so, for example, when the antitrust review is not particularly adept at inferring the intent and impact of the incumbent supplier's actions, when the regulator has substantial ability to penalize the incumbent supplier for anticompetitive behavior, when a large fraction of regulatory penalties accrue to consumers, and when the regulator faces relatively low costs of implementing accurate industry oversight.
Our derivation and discussion of these …ndings proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the key elements of the simple model we analyze. Section 3 reviews how the optimal regulatory policy responds to selected changes in industry conditions (e.g., the impact of the incumbent's anticompetitive action on its rival's cost), taking the prevailing antitrust review as given.
Section 4 examines how the optimal regulatory policy changes in response to changes in the prevailing antitrust review and examines when antitrust review serves as a useful complement to regulatory oversight. Section 5 concludes and suggests directions for further research. The
Appendix provides the proofs of all formal conclusions.
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Before proceeding, we note that the literature provides many useful policy discussions of the bene…ts and costs of antitrust regulation in the presence of regulatory oversight (e.g., Bourreau and Dogan, 2001; Cave, 2004; Katz, 2004; Rey, 2004; Gérardin and Sidak, 2005; Kahn, 2006; Ginsburg, 2009; Weiser, 2009 Wickelgren (2010, 2011) analyze the optimal timing of regulatory reviews (of mergers, for example) when better information is available at later reviews. Innes (2004) examines the optimal interplay between ex ante and ex post regulations that seek to limit the harm from accidents, 3 focusing on the role that ex ante investigation can play in reducing enforcement costs. Tirole (2004) and Weiser (2005) , among others, observe that the best policy regarding 2 Bose et al. (2015) provide more detailed proofs.
antitrust review in regulated industries typically entails case-speci…c economic analysis rather than broad, uniform, rigid rules. Our analysis supports this conclusion, given our …nding that a complete assessment of the merits of antitrust review in the presence of regulatory oversight entails many subtleties even in the simplest of economic models. Our analysis also provides a …rst step in demonstrating formally how some of the key considerations in any case-speci…c economic analysis are likely to a¤ect the merits of antitrust liability.
Elements of the Model
We consider a setting in which a vertically-integrated incumbent supplier (V ) produces a critical input (e.g., "access" to its network infrastructure) and supplies a retail product.
A rival supplier (E for "entrant") also produces the homogeneous retail product. E must secure access from V in order to produce the retail product. One unit of access is required to produce each unit of the retail product.
E's cost of producing x e units of output is F e + [ w + c e ] x e , where F e is a …xed cost of production, w is the unit price of access, and c e is an additional (downstream) marginal production cost. V 's cost of supplying x e units of access to E and supplying x v units of the retail product is
F u is an (upstream) …xed cost of supplying access. F d is a (downstream) …xed cost of producing the retail product. u is a marginal cost of supplying access and c v is a marginal cost of supplying the retail product.
We consider a setting where, as is presently the case in many telecommunications sectors, the regulator sets the price of access (w) but does not directly regulate the price of the retail product. 4 The retail price is determined by Cournot competition between V and E which 4 Tardi¤ and Taylor (2003, pp. 348-9) note that as early as 2003, "the services to which any form of price regulation is applied [in the U.S. telecommunications industry] have been narrowed primarily to access services for smaller customers [and] the remaining services have been removed from price regulation." Tardi¤  (2007, Table 3 , p. 121) summarizes the widespread deregulation of retail telecommunications services that U.S. states had undertaken by 2007. Lichtenberg (2012, p. 4) reviews the additional deregulation that was implemented between 2010 and 2012, noting that "[b] y the end of April 2012, more than one third of the nation (21 states) had deregulated its incumbent wireline carriers, and all had adopted language ensuring that broadband transport and VoIP services would remain outside commission jurisdiction." The prices of most retail telecommunications services were deregulated in the UK in 2006, when Ofcom (2006, p. 1) announced its "landmark decision" to "allow Retail price controls (RPC) to lapse on their expiry on 31 July 2006." 4 takes place after w and production costs are determined. For analytic simplicity, we assume the market demand for the retail product is linear, so P (X) = a b X, where a > 0 and b > 0 are constants, X = x v + x e is the total output of the retail product, and P ( ) denotes the corresponding price of the retail product.
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In addition to setting the price of access (w), the regulator engages in ongoing oversight of V 's behavior toward E. V can undertake either a competitive action ( ) or an anti-
V 's anticompetitive action raises E's expected cost by increasing the likelihood that E has the higher of the two possible downstream marginal costs (c H ), i.e., q( ) > q( ). ; 1 ] denotes the probability that the regulator assesses accurately V 's action toward its retail rival. The regulator's cost of ensuring "accuracy" r is K(r) = ; 1 ) in equilibrium.
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To illustrate regulatory penalties that have been imposed in practice, consider the state performance remedy plans that were imposed on the regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) in the early 2000's as a condition for providing long distance (interLATA) telephone 5 Recall from Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) that Cournot competition can be viewed as re ‡ecting outcomes that arise in settings where suppliers …rst choose production capacities and then engage in price competition. 6 "Downstream" costs include any costs associated with employing access to produce the retail product. V can increase E's downstream costs by, for example, requiring E to incur expenses that are truly unnecessary, but are alleged to be essential to ensure reliable, secure access to V 's network. 7 K(r) can be viewed as a …xed cost of establishing and implementing the capabilities, policies, and protocols required to provide an ongoing assessment of V 's actions that is accurate with probability r. 8 The regulator imposes no penalty on V if her industry oversight leads her to conclude that V has not undertaken the anticompetitive action. 9 Conclusion 2 in the Appendix provides a su¢ cient condition for r 2 ( 1 2 ; 1) in equilibrium. 5 service in the state. The plans speci…ed performance standards that the relevant RBOC was expected to achieve in providing wholesale services to competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). The plans typically required the RBOCs to make a speci…ed per-incident payment (often on the order of $75) to a CLEC for sub-standard performance that directly hindered the CLEC's ability to serve its retail customers (e.g., a relatively lengthy delay in restoring lost service to the CLEC). Some plans also required the RBOC to make payments to the State Treasury if the RBOC was found to have delivered sub-standard performance on activities that a¤ected industry competition more broadly (e.g., a malfunction of the RBOC's operational support service) or if the quality of service the RBOC delivered to all CLECs on average was judged to be sub-standard.
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V may also face antitrust sanctions for allegedly having engaged in anticompetitive behavior. D C will denote the …nancial penalty V must pay if the antitrust court concludes that V has undertaken the anticompetitive action. We capture antitrust review most simply by letting d( ) 2 (0; 1) denote the exogenous probability that V incurs court penalty D C when it undertakes action . We assume d( ) > d( ) , so the court review is more likely to conclude that V has undertaken the anticompetitive action when, in fact, it has done so.
f C 2 [ 0; 1 ] is the fraction of any court penalty imposed on V that is awarded to E. The residual fraction, 1 f C , is awarded to consumers.
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x v (w; c i ) and x e (w; c i ) will denote the equilibrium retail outputs of V and E, respectively, when the access price is w and E's downstream marginal cost is c i 2 f c L ; c H g. (2000), and Wood and Sappington (2004) for details of the performance remedy plans implemented in Texas and Michigan. 11 f C will be 1 if all court activity re ‡ects lawsuits …led by E. f C can be less than 1 if the court activity re ‡ects actions by, say, the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, or a group explicitly representing industry consumers. For simplicity, we abstract from litigation costs, so V always faces a court review. Alternative formulations are discussed in the concluding section. 12 This formulation avoids the need to model formally the decision of E, a government agency, or other interested party to initiate antitrust action against V . The formulation thereby avoids the need to specify precisely the objectives, costs, and information that underlie decisions to pursue antitrust actions in practice. These data can be viewed as in ‡uencing the exogenous d( ) and d( ) probabilities in our model. 6 action 2 f ; g, the regulatory oversight accuracy is r, and the regulatory penalty for anticompetitive behavior is D R . This expected penalty is larger when V undertakes the anticompetitive action than when it undertakes the competitive action. Formally:
V 's expected upstream pro…t when it undertakes action , given w, r, and D R , is:
V 's corresponding expected total pro…t is:
The regulator seeks to maximize the di¤erence between expected consumer welfare and regulatory monitoring costs while ensuring that V anticipates a normal pro…t from its upstream operations. 13 This pro…t is normalized to 0. Expected consumer welfare is the sum of expected consumer surplus and the expected revenue from penalties imposed on V that is awarded to consumers. Let S(w; c e ) denote equilibrium consumer surplus when the access price is w and E's downstream unit production cost is c e . Then when V undertakes the competitive action , expected consumer welfare, given w, r, and D R , is:
Observe from expression (4) that V may be penalized for allegedly having engaged in anticompetitive behavior even when it has not done so because regulatory oversight and antitrust review are imperfect (i.e., because r < 1 and d( ) > 0 ).
We will focus on the setting of primary interest where the regulator induces V to un-dertake the competitive action rather than the anticompetitive action. 14 In this setting, the regulator's problem, [RP] , is:
subject to:
The …rst constraint in expression (5) -the participation constraint -ensures that V anticipates a normal pro…t from its upstream operations when it undertakes the competitive action. The second constraint in expression (5) -the incentive compatibility constraintensures that V will undertake the competitive action rather than the anticompetitive action.
The ensuing analysis will focus on the setting of primary interest where both of the constraints in expression (5) bind at the solution to [RP] . The participation constraint will bind when V 's upstream …xed cost of production (F u ) is su¢ ciently large. The incentive compatibility constraint will bind when: (i) F e and c H are su¢ ciently small, so E will operate
are relatively large, so the impact of the anticompetitive action is pronounced; and
oversight alone is insu¢ cient to deter V from undertaking the anticompetitive action.
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The timing in the model is as follows. First, the regulator chooses the accuracy (r) of her oversight and sets the access price (w) and the regulatory penalty (D R ) to maximize net consumer welfare, W . Second, V determines whether to undertake the competitive or the anticompetitive action. Third, E's downstream unit cost of production (c e 2 fc L ; c H g)
is determined and the two suppliers choose their retail outputs simultaneously and non-14 The regulator will optimally induce V to undertake action when q( ) q( ), c H c L , and a are su¢ ciently large (so the anticompetitive action reduces expected surplus substantially) and when F e , c L c v , and K(1) are su¢ ciently small (so E is a relatively e¢ cient producer and regulatory monitoring costs are not excessive). In a richer model that admitted a broad range of behaviors in which V might engage, the regulator would choose the optimal extent to which V 's anticompetitive behavior should be limited. 15 Conclusion 2 in the Appendix speci…es the conditions under which both constraints in expression (5) bind at the solution to [RP] . The conditions include the requirement that a (the intercept of the industry inverse demand curve) is su¢ ciently large. See Assumption 1 in the Appendix, which is maintained throughout the ensuing analysis.
cooperatively. 16 Fourth, the market-clearing price is determined and consumer demand for the retail product is ful…lled. Fifth, the regulator and the court assess V 's behavior, and any resulting penalties are assessed.
Regulatory Policy Design
Before assessing the incremental value of antitrust review and the impact of antitrust review on regulatory policy, we brie ‡y examine selected determinants of the optimal regulatory policy, taking the nature of the prevailing antitrust review as given.
First consider the penalty (D R ) the regulator imposes on V when her ongoing industry oversight leads her to conclude that V has undertaken the anticompetitive action. It is conceivable that the regulator might set D R below its maximum feasible level, D R . This is the case because, due to the regulator's imperfect industry oversight (r < 1), V may incur a regulatory penalty even when it refrains from the anticompetitive action. To ensure V 's participation, the regulator must compensate V for this equilibrium expected penalty. To limit this (costly) compensation, the regulator might conceivably choose to impose less than the maximum feasible penalty on V (i.e., to set D R below D R at the solution to [RP] ).
In practice, though, the penalties that regulators are authorized to implement can be quite limited. 17 To re ‡ect these common institutional constraints, we focus on settings where the regulator imposes the maximum feasible penalty on V whenever her oversight indicates that V has undertaken the anticompetitive action. 18 Observation 1 provides a su¢ cient condition for this policy to be optimal. 16 We assume V and E both serve retail customers in equilibrium. Su¢ cient conditions are provided in Lemma 2 in the Appendix. 17 Critics routinely charged that the penalties speci…ed in the state performance remedy plans that were imposed on RBOCs in the early 2000s were insu¢ cient to deter anticompetitive behavior. 
Observation 1 identi…es four elements of the environment -in addition to a relatively small magnitude of D R -that lead the regulator to systematically impose the maximum feasible penalty on V . First, f R is close to 0, so most of the regulatory penalty is awarded to consumers, rather than to E. Second, d( ) D C is small, so imperfections in the antitrust review process do not impose large equilibrium expected penalties on V . Third, F u is small, so the regulator can set w close to u without reducing V 's expected upstream pro…t below 0. The resulting relatively low upstream pro…t margin (w u) increases V 's incentive to raise E's costs because the associated reduction in E's demand for the input does not reduce V 's upstream pro…t substantially. In this setting, imposing the maximum feasible regulatory penalty on V can be valuable in precluding V from undertaking the anticompetitive action.
Fourth, c v is large, so V is relatively inclined to raise E's cost to help o¤set V 's limited cost advantage (or its cost disadvantage).
We now consider selected determinants of the regulator's other policy instruments -the access price (w) and the accuracy of industry oversight ( r). Observation 2 reports how the regulator adjusts these instruments as V 's ability to raise its rival's cost increases, i.e., as q increases or q decreases, so V 's pursuit of the anticompetitive action increases E's expected unit cost of production more substantially.
Observation 2. As V 's ability to raise its rival's cost increases, the regulator increases the accuracy of her oversight and reduces the access price (i.e., As V 's anticompetitive action becomes more e¤ective at raising E's cost, the action becomes more pro…table for V to pursue, ceteris paribus. To induce V to refrain from this otherwise relatively pro…table action, the regulator increases the accuracy of her oversight.
The increased accuracy reduces the expected regulatory penalty that V anticipates in equilibrium (when it undertakes the competitive action). Consequently, the regulator is able to reduce w while still ensuring nonnegative upstream pro…t for V .
It can be shown that the regulator will also increase r and reduce w as consumer demand for the retail product (a) increases or as V 's upstream production cost (u or F u ) declines.
When a increases, E produces more output, and so purchases more of the input from V .
Consequently, the regulator can reduce w without reducing V 's expected upstream pro…t below 0. The reduction in w and the increase in the scale of the retail market increases V 's incentive to increase E's unit cost of production. To ensure that V refrains from the anticompetitive action, the regulator increases the accuracy of her oversight.
When u or F u declines, the regulator can reduce w without reducing V 's upstream pro…t below 0. Furthermore, because a reduction in w increases E's equilibrium output, the regulator can reduce w by more than u declines while still ensuring nonnegative upstream pro…t for V . The reduction in w u makes sales of the input to E less pro…table for V , which reduces V 's opportunity cost of reducing E's retail output. The regulator increases the accuracy of her industry oversight to counteract V 's increased incentive to raise its rival's cost.
One might suspect that the regulator would increase the accuracy of her industry oversight as the accuracy become less costly to improve. However, as Observation 3 reports, this
is not the case in the present setting.
Observation 3. Changes in the cost of improving the accuracy of regulatory oversight do not a¤ect either the optimal access charge or the optimal accuracy of the industry oversight Observation 3 re ‡ects the fact that k does not directly a¤ect V 's expected pro…t, regardless of the action V undertakes. Consequently, changes in k do not a¤ect the trade-o¤s the regulator faces as she chooses w and r to induce V to undertake the competitive action while ensuring zero upstream pro…t for V . In particular, there is a single (w; r) pair that continues to solve both the participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint (in expression (5)) as k changes. The maximum level of net consumer welfare (W ) the regulator can achieve declines as k increases, but the best way to achieve the (now lower) W does not change.
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Having examined how the regulator adjusts her policy instruments in response to selected changes in the environment in which she operates, we now consider the interaction between the optimal regulatory policy and the prevailing antitrust policy, and assess the merits of subjecting V to both antitrust review and regulatory oversight.
Regulatory and Antitrust Policy Interactions
We begin by considering how the optimal regulatory policy changes as key elements of to undertake the anticompetitive action declines, ceteris paribus. Consequently, the regulator can reduce the costly resources she devotes to improving the accuracy of her industry oversight ( r) without inducing V to undertake the anticompetitive action.
When d increases, antitrust review becomes less reliable in the sense that V becomes more likely to incur the court penalty even though it has refrained from the anticompetitive action.
The less reliable antitrust review reduces V 's incentive to undertake the competitive action.
To enhance this incentive (and thereby ensure that V refrains from the anticompetitive action), the regulator increases the accuracy of her oversight.
Changes in the key elements of the antitrust review also a¤ect the optimal access charge, as Proposition 2 reports.
Proposition 2. The regulator increases the access charge when the court penalty increases, the court's ability to detect V 's anticompetitive action accurately increases, or the court's ability to verify V 's competitive action accurately declines (i.e.,
> 0, and
When the court penalty increases, V faces a higher expected court penalty even when it undertakes the competitive action. The associated reduction in r also increases the (regulatory) penalty that V anticipates in equilibrium. (Recall Proposition 1.) The regulator increases w to ensure that V continues to earn a normal upstream pro…t in equilibrium.
Recall from Proposition 1 that the regulator reduces the accuracy of her industry oversight as the court's ability to detect V 's anticompetitive action accurately increases. The reduced regulatory accuracy increases the equilibrium regulatory penalty that V anticipates.
The regulator increases w to ensure V continues to earn a normal pro…t from its upstream operations in equilibrium. The regulator also increases the access charge (w) to help compensate V for the increased court penalty it anticipates in equilibrium as the court's ability to verify V 's competitive action accurately decreases.
Having determined how the optimal regulatory policy changes as the prevailing antitrust review changes, it remains to assess when antitrust review is a useful complement to regulatory oversight. To do so, we consider how changes in the magnitude of the court penalty (D C ) a¤ect net consumer welfare. An increase in D C can be viewed as a source of increased antitrust discipline. Propositions 3 and 4 examine how this increased discipline a¤ects net 13 consumer welfare.
Proposition 3. Net consumer welfare increases as the court penalty increases (i.e.,
Proposition 3 reveals that increased antitrust discipline in the form of a higher court penalty increases net consumer welfare either when the maximum feasible regulatory penalty ( D R ) is su¢ ciently small or when a relatively large fraction of the court penalty is awarded to consumers (i.e., when 1 f C exceeds 1 f R ). When D R is small, regulatory oversight is unable to impose substantial discipline on V . Consequently, increased antitrust discipline is useful in deterring V from undertaking the anticompetitive action.
When consumers receive a relatively large fraction of the court penalty, they bene…t directly from increased expected penalty revenue as D C increases. Consumers also bene…t as increases in D C induce the regulator to reduce the accuracy of her industry oversight (r).
(Recall Proposition 1.) Consumers gain from both the reduced regulatory oversight costs and the associated increase in equilibrium regulatory penalty revenue.
To illustrate the gains that consumers can experience as D C increases, consider: The fraction of the court penalty that accrues to consumers (1 f C ) may be relatively small when antitrust review primarily results from private lawsuits …led by industry competitors. In such settings, consumers can be harmed from increased antitrust discipline in the form of a larger court penalty.
Proposition 4. Net consumer welfare declines as the court penalty increases (i.e.,
at the solution to [RP] ) if f C > f R , and
Proposition 4 con…rms that increased antitrust discipline in the form of a higher court penalty can reduce net consumer welfare when a relatively small fraction of the court penalty accrues to consumers (so f C is su¢ ciently large). In this event, consumers receive little of the additional court penalty revenue and are harmed by the higher retail price that results from the increased access charge the regulator establishes to compensate V for the increase in its equilibrium expected court penalty. (Recall Proposition 2.)
Proposition 4 also indicates that, ceteris paribus, a higher court penalty is more likely to reduce net consumer welfare when: (i) the antitrust review is inaccurate in the sense that
is small; (ii) the cost of increasing the accuracy of regulatory oversight (k) is small; and (iii) potential regulatory discipline ( D R ) is pronounced. When antitrust review is inaccurate, a higher court penalty provides little incremental deterrence because V may well incur the large penalty even when it undertakes the competitive action. Furthermore, the increase in D C increases the court penalty that V expects to incur in equilibrium and thereby increases the extent to which the regulator must increase w in order to ensure nonnegative upstream pro…t for V .
When k is small and D R is large, it is not very costly for the regulator, acting alone, to create strong incentives for V to undertake the competitive action. When the cost of establishing accurate industry oversight is low, the regulator will do so. Consequently, V recognizes that it is likely to be penalized severely if (and only if) if it undertakes the anticompetitive action. Consequently, V will refrain from this action even in the absence of antitrust discipline.
Proposition 4 holds for any value of D C . Consequently, net consumer welfare declines under the identi…ed conditions identi…ed in the proposition whenever non-trivial antitrust review is added to regulatory oversight. This conclusion is stated formally, for emphasis.
Corollary. Suppose D C > 0 and the conditions identi…ed in Proposition 4 hold. Then net consumer welfare is higher in the absence of antitrust review than in its presence.
To illustrate the magnitude of the losses that antitrust review can introduce, consider: Although antitrust review can reduce net consumer welfare, any antitrust review that is implemented generates a higher level of net consumer welfare as its ability to detect V 's 20 The increased access price causes the equilibrium retail price to increase from 5:42 to 5:60.
anticompetitive action accurately increases.
Proposition 5. Net consumer welfare increases as antitrust review becomes better able to detect V 's anticompetitive action accurately (i.e.,
Proposition 5 re ‡ects the fact that V 's incentive to undertake the anticompetitive action declines as the court becomes better able to detect V 's anticompetitive action accurately.
Consequently, the regulator can conserve on oversight costs by reducing the accuracy of regulatory oversight without inducing V to undertake the anticompetitive action. The reduced oversight costs enhance net consumer welfare.
Proposition 6 reports the related conclusion that net consumer welfare often declines as the ability of the antitrust review to detect V 's competitive action declines.
g. Then net consumer welfare declines as the court becomes less able to detect V 's competitive action accurately (i.e., Perhaps more surprisingly, consumers can bene…t from a reduction in the court's ability to detect V 's competitive action accurately.
. Then net consumer welfare increases as the court becomes less able to detect V 's competitive action accurately (i.e., In essence, Proposition 7 indicates that when consumers are awarded a relatively large fraction of the revenue generated by court penalties, e¤orts to enhance the accuracy of antitrust oversight can be counterproductive because they can reduce the incidence of court penalties that ‡ow to consumers in equilibrium.
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Conclusions
We have analyzed a simple model to begin to assess the merits of antitrust review in regulated industries. We found that antitrust review can enhance consumer welfare in many plausible settings. However, antitrust review can be counterproductive in some settings even when the review entails no direct costs. Antitrust review can reduce consumer welfare, for example, when the review is not particularly adept at distinguishing between competitive and anticompetitive behavior, when the regulator is empowered to impose large …nancial penalties if she detects anticompetitive behavior, when a relatively large fraction of these penalties accrue to consumers, and when the regulator faces relatively low costs of implementing accurate industry oversight.
Our …nding that antitrust review can either enhance or reduce consumer welfare in reg-21 This conclusion re ‡ects our focus on net consumer welfare. Total expected surplus generally increases as the court's ability to detect V 's competitive action accurately increases. 22 Net consumer welfare can increase as d increases even when f C = f R if the court review is substantially less accurate than the prevailing regulatory oversight. To illustrate, suppose d = 0:6; D C = D R = 2; and f C = f R = 0:1 in the setting of Example 1. Then W increases from 12:027 to 12:087 as d increases from 0:3 to 0:5. Expected total welfare (the sum of net consumer welfare and industry pro…t) declines from 24:713 to 24:514.
ulated industries supports the view that the merits of such review are best assessed on a case-by-case basis (e.g., Tirole, 2004; Weiser, 2005 Our analysis also explored how regulatory policy optimally adapts to changes in the characteristics of prevailing antitrust policy. We showed that regulatory and antitrust oversight are substitutes in the sense that the regulator optimally reduces the resources she devotes to improving the accuracy of her industry oversight as antitrust review becomes better able to assess the true intent of the incumbent supplier's actions. We also determined how regulated access prices optimally respond to changes in the characteristics of the prevailing antitrust review process.
We found that the interactions between antitrust and regulatory policy can be subtle and varied even in the streamlined model that we examined. Additional subtlety and complexity can emerge more generally. To illustrate, in practice, the accuracy of antitrust review may vary with the accuracy of the established regulatory oversight, in part because the facts presented in court may re ‡ect …ndings by industry regulators. The regulator's decision about the optimal accuracy of her industry oversight will become more complex when the accuracy a¤ects both regulatory governance and the outcomes of antitrust reviews.
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In practice, of course, both the antitrust review process and the regulatory oversight process are endogenous. We did not model the former endogeneity explicitly for analytic simplicity. Additional strategic issues can arise when the entrant can exercise explicit control over the antitrust review of the incumbent supplier's actions. Moderate litigation costs could encourage the entrant to sue the incumbent only when it has undertaken an anticompetitive action, and could thereby enhance the e¢ cacy of antitrust review. However, if the court is prone to substantial Type I error and potential court-awarded damages substantially exceed relevant litigation costs, the entrant may sue the incumbent for anticompetitive behavior even when the entrant knows the incumbent has refrained from such behavior.
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Future research should account for additional actions by the regulator. For example, the regulator might in ‡uence the technology employed in the industry. 26 In settings where antitrust review would harm consumers, the regulator might encourage the incumbent to adopt an ine¢ cient technology that precludes the operation of additional industry competitors. 27 By doing so, the regulator may be able to enhance consumer welfare by avoiding counterproductive antitrust reviews.
A broader array of actions by the incumbent supplier also merit consideration. 28 In practice, incumbent suppliers can choose among di¤erent types of anticompetitive activities and may have considerable ‡exibility in determining the extent to which each activity is pursued. 29 In such settings, the regulator will face the additional task of determining the extent to which various anticompetitive activities should be deterred.
Future research should also account for the more severe information asymmetries that 25 McAfee et al. (2008) provide a formal analysis of such considerations. Spulber and Yoo (2007, p. 1863) observe that "[p]ermitting courts to entertain antitrust suits might simply invite disappointed parties who failed to obtain relief from the agency to try to take a second bite of the apple." 26 Alternatively, the regulator might be able to choose the short-term investigative e¤ort she devotes to assessing the merits of speci…c complaints lodged by potential or actual industry competitors. 27 For example, the regulator may direct the incumbent supplier to install a network infrastructure that does not readily admit interconnection with other suppliers. The Supreme Court (2004, § IV) observes that judicial oversight in regulated industries "would seem destined to distort investment." 28 Alternative forms of industry competition (e.g., price competition among suppliers of di¤erentiated products in the presence of entry costs) also merit investigation. 29 To illustrate, an incumbent supplier might undertake actions that raise a rival's …xed cost of production and/or reduce the demand for the rival's services.
regulators often possess in practice. The regulator's comprehensive industry knowledge in our model allowed her to predict the incumbent's action perfectly and to deter the anticompetitive action at minimum social cost. In practice, regulators typically face more extensive uncertainty about the range of actions available to industry suppliers, the e¤ects of these actions, and the precise manner in which industry suppliers will react to the incentives fashioned by regulatory (and antitrust) policy.
The role of antitrust review in counteracting regulatory capture (e.g., Stigler, 1971) also merits formal investigation. We modeled the regulator as a faithful representative of consumer interests. To the extent that regulators are motivated to promote the interests of industry suppliers, antitrust review may provide a useful check on supplier actions that regulators have explicitly or implicitly condoned. ;1 ]; D R D R W subject to:
where
Proof. Standard techniques reveal that the (interior) pro…t-maximizing outputs of E and V are, respectively:
Straightforward calculations then reveal that V 's expected pro…t when it undertakes the competitive action and the anticompetitive action are, respectively:
(12) implies that consumers'surplus when E unit downstream cost is c i is:
(13) implies that V 's upstream pro…t when it undertakes the competitive action is:
(13) also implies that V 's expected pro…t when it undertakes the competitive action is:
Tedious calculations then reveal:
Let a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , and a 4 be de…ned by the following equations:
. (16) 7 a 3 7 u 5 c v 2 c = 16
Assumption 1 is maintained throughout the analysis.
Assumption 1. a > max f a 1; a 2 ; a 3 ; a 4 ; 7 u + 2 c v ; u + 2 c c v g .
The following lemmas are employed to prove Conclusion 2 (which speci…es the focus of the analysis in the text) and the formal conclusions in the text.
Lemma 1. If the incentive compatibility constraint binds at the solution to [RP] and either
Proof. (9) .
Proof. From Lemma 1:
Therefore:
Consequently, (12) implies that x e > 0 if c v > c H .
Since w 0 and c L < c H , (12) 
, then:
Proof. De…ne:
Observe that g (0) = < 0 and
Therefore, g (w) is a concave function of w. Consequently, since g (0) < 0, it must be the case that g 0 (0) > 0 if a real solution to the equation g(w) = 0 is to exist.
It is apparent from (20) that g (w) reaches a maximum at e w 1 4
Hence, g (w) = 0 has a unique solution if:
When > e w 3 b
; the equation g (w) = 0 does not have a real solution.
When < 
Proof. See Bose et al. (2015) . ; 1) and the participation and the incentive compatibility constraints both bind at a solution to [RP] if:
Proof. See Bose et al. (2015) .
The ensuing analysis will consider solutions to [RP] in which r 2 1 2
; 1 and the participation and incentive compatibility constraints both bind.
Lemma 5 is employed in the proofs of Observation 1 and Proposition 3. Proof. Di¤erentiating (8) and (9) 
It is readily veri…ed that j j < 0 when Assumption 1 holds. Therefore:
(26) and (27) imply Proof of Observation 1.
(22) implies:
The last inequality in (28) holds because:
(28) implies 2 > 1 . Since j j < 0 , (26) and (27) imply:
From (25):
@r @D R < 0 from Lemma 5. Therefore, since j j < 0:
(30) and (33) imply:
(31), (32), and (34) provide:
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Let W denote the value of W at the solution to [RP] . From (10):
Using results from the proof of Conclusion 2, it is readily veri…ed that the expression in (37) is negative under the speci…ed condition. Therefore, dW dD R > 0 , so the regulator will set
Proof of Observation 2.
Di¤erentiating (8) and (9) 
Since j j < 0, (38) implies:
The inequality in (39), which re ‡ects Lemmas 1 and 3, implies @r @q < 0.
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Similarly, since j j < 0, (38) implies: 
Since j j < 0, (42) implies:
The proof that @w @k = 0 is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Since j j < 0, (43) implies:
The inequality in (44), which follows from Lemma 3, implies
From ( 
(50) and (51) imply:
(49) and (52) imply:
(48) and (53) imply @r @d > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Since j j < 0, (43) implies: 
Furthermore:
(56) and (57) provide:
2 a w u c c v , and (59)
(58), (59), and (60) imply:
Since 2 
Recall that Consequently, when D R is su¢ ciently close to 0, the …rst two terms in (61) are strictly positive, and so (61) and (62) + 1 f R from (56), (73) implies:
(74) implies:
It can be veri…ed that: 
It can be veri…ed that the numerator in (76) is positive when IC binds. Therefore, since > 0; the denominator in (76) is also positive. Consequently, (74) and (76) imply:
where ( 
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where '
(79) and (80) imply:
Since r 2 [ 1 2
; 1 ], (81) implies:
(0) < 0 if f R 2 f C + 1 3 < 0 and a a 4 , where a 4 is de…ned in (18).
From Lemma 3, w < e w = 1 4
[ a + 3 u + c v 2 c ] at the solution to [RP] . From (78):
[ 7 a 7 u 5 c v 2 c ] < 0 . (83) The last inequality in (83) re ‡ects Assumption 1.
Observe from (78) that (w) is linear in w. Therefore, since w < e w at the solution to [RP] , (w) < 0 for all relevant w if (0) < 0 and ( e w) < 0. Consequently, the Conclusion follows from (75), (82), and (83).
Proof of Proposition 7.
